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Jie Zhang
College of Business Administration
University of Toledo
Jennifer.zhang@utoledo.edu
Abstract
Online auction web sites provide a convenient yet risky trading venue for the participants.
The uncertainty about the product quality and the credibility of the traders, however, may
impede the liquidity and efficiency of the trades in online auctions. This research seeks to
establish a framework to better assess the effect of a seller’s feedback “reputation” on the
closing price of an online auction. In contrast to the literature on reputation in Internet
auction, we claim and prove that buyers assess a seller’s reputation from her feedbacks
related to her selling activities only but not those from both sales and purchases. We build a
model to illustrate how this reputation system works and test the hypotheses with data
collected from the eBay web site on auctions of Apple iPod MP3 players. It is found that (1)
the numbers of a seller’s positive and negative comments from her buyers solely are
significantly correlated with the bidding price of her sales transactions; (2) the numbers of a
seller’s positive or negative comments earned in her purchasing transactions are not
significant in explaining the bidding price of her sales transactions; (3) negative comments
are weighted more heavily than positive ones.
Key Words: Online auction, Reputation, Trust

1. Introduction
Electronic business has grown dramatically over the past decade, represented by more
than 25 percent growth rate in annual sales (US Census Bureau). Consumer-to-consumer
online auction web sites, for example, eBay.com, Yahoo! Auction, and Amazon auction etc.,
have become one of the most successful business models of electronic commerce. With 9.4
million registered users, 971 million items listed, and $24 billion worth of items sold in 2003,
eBay has become the fastest growing and the most popular online auction market among the
all. It realized $2.17 billion net revenue in 2003, a 78 percent increase over the year before. In
addition, eBay has expanded its operation scope into 28 foreign countries other than the US.
The fast growing revenue from online auction business has shown a promising future of the
e-commerce.
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The success of the auction web sites comes from several advantages: (1) The Internet
provides convenient and efficient marketplace for the consumers to trade among each other.
In contrast with the auction in a physical auction site, online auction provides anonymity,
accuracy, and interactiveness to the customers so that the transactions become more
transparent and up-to-date. (2) More importantly, online auction has very low entry cost for
the sellers. Any ordinary individual can easily bring her goods to millions of potentially
interested buyers worldwide without setting up any storefronts or bearing with the high cost
incurred in transactions. Online auction web sites offer a virtual “flea market” where
everyone can become a seller as easily as being a buyer.
However, the ideal “frictionless” marketplace cannot exist without building trust
among online traders. Traders exist in the name of their user IDs, which could be created and
changed easily. A trader could possibly have as many identities on the Internet as have
“eyebrows” in the real life. The anonymity and virtuality of the traders’ online identity
challenges trust building on the Internet community, especially in the consumer-to-consumer
online auction web sites. It is difficult for the traders to tell the difference between reputable
online sellers and criminals who use the Internet to rob people. Online auctions remain the
number one aching for Internet fraud. According to the Internet Fraud Watch operated by the
National Consumers League, online auction frauds accounted for 90 percent of the total
frauds reported to the Internet Fraud Watch in 2002 and the average loss per person rose from
$310 in 1999 to around $468 in 2002, indicating the deterioration in online trading safety.
To mitigate the negative effect of frauds happened in online auction, many auction
web sites have set up some feedback forums with comments about the sellers based on other
people’s experiences (Figure 1). The basic idea is to use the inputs from the traders about
their own experiences of trading with that user ID to signal all the other traders about that
traders’ credibility and affect their behavior accordingly. Those feedback mechanisms are
expected to reflect the true reputation of the traders and to help identifying the fraudulent
ones. Moreover, the downside effect of getting negative ratings is also expected to threaten
the participants to behave well in the transactions involved on those web sites.
A serial of research took the data from eBay transactions and examined the effect of
online feedback profiles on bidding outcomes: Ba and Pavlou 2002, Bajari and Hortacsu
2003, Houser and Wooders 2000, Melnik and Alm 2002, McDonald and Slawson 2002, to
name a few. As shown in Section 2 of the paper, fruitful results have been achieved in the
literature.
But in our view, one of the most important feature of online auction markets, or more
generally, most e-commerce markets, is these new markets greatly reduce transaction cost,
particularly, there is very low entry cost for sellers. This means sellers are no longer sellers in
the traditional sense, usually a firm, or a retailer store, which sells large quantity of product to
the market with almost no purchase from the market. Now any user can sell there goods in
the market with a very low fee. A user can be a buyer for some time, and a seller for other
times. Actually, this is the defining feature, and the basic idea behind eBay - the billion-dollar
business - a “flea market”. Unfortunately, the important implication of this feature has almost
been completely ignored in the literature. All the paper mentioned above assume sellers only
sell in the markets, while buyers only purchase from the markets.
Our paper is the first attempt to investigate the importance of such a feature.
Specifically, we show that since any user can always change her role at any time in these
online auction markets, which they do, any user’s reputation actually has two components:
her “selling reputation”, coming from her previous selling records and her “buying
reputation”, coming from her previous buying records. And given the current mechanism
design of these markets, the costs and benefits to build the two reputations are different for
users. This gives incentive for users to strategically manipulate their reputations. But rational
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buyers should be able to understand this and would separate a seller’s selling reputation from
buying reputation when trying to infer the true probability of receiving the product. As a
result, the two types of reputation have very different effects on winning prices. In our model,
with the assumption that sellers only ship the product when payments are received, we show
that sellers’ good selling reputation increase winning prices, bad selling reputation reduce
winning prices, while sellers’ buying reputation has no significant effect on winning prices.
Using actual auction data collected from eBay, we show empirically that first, sellers
do make purchases as well as sales, in our sample, for an average seller, 38 percent of all the
transactions are actually purchases, and for some sellers, it can be as high as 99 percent. 39
percent of the sellers have buying transaction more that 50 percent; second, the effects of the
two types of reputation confirm our theoretical prediction. Sellers’ good selling feedback
increases sell prices, bad selling feedback reduces sell prices, and sellers’ buying feedback
have the wrong signs and are not statistically significant. We do find some other variables,
such as product condition and accepted payment methods, also affect the sell prices.
Hence our paper contributes to the literature by clarifying the meaning of reputation
in online auction markets theoretically and empirically. This may change some of the
previous results obtained in the literature, for example, some papers find no significant effect
of positive and/or negative reputations, and this is possibly due to the inclusion of sellers’
“buying feedback” dampen the effect of reputation. More importantly, our results call for
more attention to the strategic aspects of reputation and rethinking of the long-short run
player reputation framework frequently used in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on
theoretical conclusions on reputation and empirical results on the effect online feedback
profiles. A model pointing out our idea is brought out in Section 3. Then Section 4 shows the
empirical evidence and tests hypotheses. Section 5 summaries the whole work and discusses
the limitation and opportunities for further research.

2. Literature Review
The reputation formation and has been extensively studied in economics using game
theory. The reputation literature, for example, Kreps and Wilson 1982, Milgrom and Roberts
1982, Fudenberg and Levine 1992, Klein and Leffler 1981, Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson
2002, suggests that the feedback mechanisms used in the online auction web sites can enforce
the traders to take the cooperation strategy and act honestly.1
A review of principal empirical research results on online feedback forums is shown
in Table 1.2 They mainly studied the impact of feedback ratings on the prices and probability
of sales. A trader can observe any other trader’s feedback comments left by her trading
partners in the previous transactions. Actions of either a buyer or a seller, such as willingness
to bid, bidding prices setting, determination to complete the transactions, will be influenced
by the ratings of her trading partners.
Table 1 Summary of Principal Research Literature
Citation
Ba and Pavlou, 2002

Items sold
Music, software,
Electronics
Bajari and Hortacsu, Coins
2003

1
2

Remarks
Positive feedback increased estimated price, but negative
feedback did not have an effect
Both positive and negative feedback affect probability of
modeled buyer entry into the auction, but only positive

For a detailed review, see Dellarocas 2003.
Adapted from Resnick Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood, 2002.
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Dewan and
2001
Eaton, 2002
Houser
Wooders, 2000
Kalyanam
McIntyre, 2001
Kauffman
Wood, 2000
Lee, Im and
2000

Hsu, Stamps

feedback had a significant effect on final price
Higher net score increases price

Electric guitars

and
and
and
Lee,

Livingston
Lucking-Reiley
et
al., 2000
Melnik and Alm,
2002
McDonald
and
Slawson, 2002
Resnick
and
Zeckhauser, 2002
Resnick Zeckhauser,
Swanson
and
Lockwood, 2002

Negative feedback reduces probability of sale, but not
price of sold items
Pentium chips
Positive feedback increases price; negative feedback
reduces it
Palm
Pilot Positive feedback increases price; negative feedback
PDAs
reduces price
Coins
No significant effects, but negative feedback seems to
increase price (!) in univariate analysis
Computer
Negative feedback reduces price, but only for used items
monitors
and
printers
Golf clubs
Positive feedback increases both likelihood of sale and
price; effect tapers off once a record is established
Coins
No effect from positive feedback; negative feedback
reduces price
Gold coins
Positive feedback increases price; negative feedback
decreases price
Dolls
Higher net score (positives -negatives) increases price
MP3
players,
Beanie babies
Vintage
postcards

Both forms of feedback affect probability of sale but not
price contingent on sale
Controlled field experiment; established seller
commands higher prices than newcomers; among
newcomers, small amounts of negative feedback have
little effect

However, they made assumption based on the traditional reputation theory that a
customer is either good or bad and that characteristics never change over time. Their findings
of the relationship between the seller’s reputation and the bidding price are ambiguous. When
I assume strategic customers, they may behave differently from what the literature presented.
For example, they can manipulate the values of their ratings by acting differently as a buyer
from as a seller, or across different transaction amounts. In this case, the ratings do not
correlated directly with the total value of ratings, but the buyers would care about the positive
ratings of the customers as a seller exclusively, and vice versa. I expect that the empirical test
under this assumption can lead to better results and can explain the mixed results obtained in
the previous studies. None of the literature has separated the comments of a seller earned
from her sellers from those from her buyers.
If the above hypotheses are proved, more suggestions can be provided to the online
auction companies to improve their feedback mechanism, such as separating the ratings as a
buyer or as a seller, give a weight to the scores of the ratings, etc.3
The phenomenon that some sellers do not solely sell, but also buy on eBay has been
noticed in the literature, for example, Cabral and Hortacsu [2003] found in their dataset, that
38 percent of the sellers in the Beanie baby and silver proof set, 33 percent in gold coins, and
20 percent in ThinkPad categories followed the “buy first, sell later” strategy. So they
conclude that “buy first and sell later” is a widespread phenomenon on eBay and they
interpret this as evidence that some sellers start off by investing (as a buyer) on an initial
3

While we were working on this paper in January 2004, eBay changed its display of member feedback profiles
by separating their feedback from buyers from those from sellers, exactly as we have suggested.
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reputation history, assuming that buyers would take the initial record of sellers as a genuine
selling record although it contains selling as well as buying. Unsurprisingly, their empirical
test didn’t support their theoretical prediction that sellers with bad reputation should engage
in this activity.
Essentially, we are asking what the effect of a seller’s buying record on her reputation
as a seller, or on the auction price are. So we are not limiting our attention to this particular
“buy first, sell later” phenomenon. If a seller’s buying records are generally good, and if the
good purchasing records did improve the seller’s “reputation” as a buyer, and increase her
selling prices, there is nothing preventing the seller from buying the good reputation at any
time after her initial period on eBay, though she may be more eager to do so at the beginning.
But if buyers are capable of distinguishing a seller’s selling behavior from her buying records,
these buying transactions would not affect the seller’s “selling reputation”, hence would not
affect the auction price. The “buy first and sell later” strategy might just be the result of a
natural fact that people begin to deal with eBay and learn the rules from their purchasing
transactions, and only start to sell when they get more experienced and interested later on.
Any other purchase after the initial period could also arise from true demand of the products,
instead of strategic manipulation of reputation.

3. The Model
A fully developed model would be very complicate because now there are no short
lived buyers. All users are long run player and have to solve dynamic maximization problem
in order to make decision of selling, buying, or how much to bid. Specifically, since bidders
have to contempt the effect of her bid behavior on her reputation, and hence long run profit,
we lose the ability to use the elegant long-run/short-run player reputation framework
developed since Klein and Leffler [1981], Sharpiro [1983], and applied to ecommerce setting
by Dellacoce [2002]. Sine we only want to demonstrate that the reputation of the player when
they are playing different roles have different meaning for other players, we assume for now
that the bidding decision is static, and leave strategic buying/bidding of sellers for further
research. We will show this condition is satisfied in the equilibrium.
We develop a simple model based on Houser and Wooders [2000] to illustrate our
point. Assume all players live infinite periods. A player, or a user, can sell a unit of
indivisible product, or purchase a unit in any period. We assume whether to buy, or sell in
current period is determined exogenously.
There are two types of players, H (honest) and D (dishonest), and the fraction of
honest player is θ ∈ [0,1] , which is common knowledge to all players. But the exact type of a
player is private information of that player.
If a user sells a unit of the product in current period, she becomes a seller. She lists the
product on eBay, provides description of the product, shipping, payment and other
information, and perhaps picture of the product.
Other users who want to buy the product then submit bid for the product. Buyer i’s
value of the good is vi , which is randomly drawn from a continuous distribution V [v, v] . The
auction is a sealed second price bid. The highest bidder wins the auction, and pays the price
of the second highest bid. After the auction, buyer then can choose to default, or to make
payment to the seller.
We assume seller always wait till receive the payment before taking any action. So
seller would never ship the product before she actually received payment. This make sure
there is no gain from winning a bid but not making payment, so buyers always make payment
after win an auction, no matter what type the buyer is.
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After receiving payment, a seller can choose to cooperate (co, deliver the goods) or
cheat (ch, not deliver the good). An honest player always deliver the good when she is a
seller and receive payment from a winning bidder, while a dishonest player does not deliver
the goods after receiving payment so she can make immediate profit.
After received the product, or not received the product for long enough time, the
buyer report the result to the system and everybody can view the feedback. In addition to any
comment, the buyer explicitly gives +1(positive) to a satisfied transaction, -1 to unsatisfied
transaction, and 0 (neutral) otherwise. We assume the feedback is noisy. So there is a
probability α that the buyer will report a negative feedback even the seller cooperate, and a
probability β that the buyer report a positive feedback even the seller cheat.
We assume there is no withdraw of feedback after it is reported.
Given buyer i’s value of the good is vi , the bid function is
b(vi , Ps , N s , Pb , Nb ) = p( Ps , N s , Pb , N b )vi ,
(1)
in which p( Ps , N s , Pb , Nb ) is the probability that the seller, with history ( Ps , N s , Pb , N b ) , would
deliver the goods. Ps , N s , Pb , Nb are the number of positive, negative feedbacks of the user as
seller and buyer, respectively.
Assume the prior consumer belief of θ is p1 , we have following proposition:
Propositon1. If a buyer distinguishes the seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying
reputation”, the posterior expected consumer beliefs of p is given by:
α Ps (1 − α ) N s p1
( p | Ps , N s , Pb , Nb ) = Ps
;
(2)
α (1 − α ) N s p1 + β Ps (1 − β ) N s (1 − p1 )
If a buyer takes all feedbacks as the sellers “selling records”, as commonly used in the
literature, then the posterior expected consumer beliefs of p is given by:
α P (1 − α ) N p1
( p | P, N ) = P
α (1 − α ) N p1 + β P (1 − β ) N (1 − p1 )
.
(3)
α Ps + Pb (1 − α ) N s + Nb p1
= Ps + Pb
α
(1 − α ) Ns + Nb p1 + β Ps + Pb (1 − β ) N s + Nb (1 − p1 )
Proposition 2: If a buyer distinguishes the seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying
reputation”, bid price will increase with Ps , and decrease with N s , but will be unrelated with
the buying reputation Pb and N b . If a buyer takes all feedbacks as the sellers “selling records”,
bid price will increase with Ps and Pb , and decrease with N s and N b .
If a buyer does not distinguish the seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying
reputation”, there would be extra incentive for the buyer who wants to improve reputation to
bid price higher than the expected value. If such a buyer wins the auction, the price would
also reflect her “reputation motives”, that is, it is correlated with buyer’s reputation. For
example, we would expect a buyer with lower reputation would bid higher price. But if
buyers can distinguish seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying reputation”, there is no
“reputation motives”, and buyers’ biding function would again be static.

4. Evidence from eBay
The last step is to use the transaction data to test the hypotheses from the model and
from other observations. Observations from the on-line auction website eBay.com were
collected in February 2004.
4.1 Data Collection Procedure
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We wrote an intelligent web agent (spider) program to collect transaction data and
feedback data from eBay’s website. First we searched eBay (using search tool they provided
on their web site) for auctions containing the keywords “iPod” and check the “completed
auction only” checkbox. This took us to a page listing auctions completed within the past two
weeks containing the keyword. The spider program will then follow the link to each of the
auction pages on the search page and automatically download the relevant transaction data,
for example, include trading item, the user ID of the seller and the winning buyer, starting
and end date/time of the auction, starting bid prices, end prices, number of bidders
participated, description of the auction items etc. The program then goes to the seller’s
feedback page to download the whole history of the feedbacks the seller has received from
her previous transactions. The seller’s reputation is measured by such indices as unique
number of positive/negative feedback, unique positive/negative feedback ratio. We separate
the indices into three groups---from unique sellers, from unique buyers and from both--according to the types of the transaction for that user. The reputation scores are derived from
the feedback history up to the end time of the auction, that is, by the exact time the auction is
closed. In total we obtained transaction and reputation data for auctions on eBay for three
models of iPod by Apple, with closing dates between February 14 and February 28.
We further removed the transactions belonging to either of the following cases and are
left with 135 valid auction transactions.
• The item for sale is not iPod per se, but parts or accessories for iPods;
• There was no bid in the entire auction period;
• The auction ended with buy-it-now;
• The auction was relisted because reserved price was not met;
• The item is no longer for available for sale;
• The auction was terminated due to errors in the listing.
4.2 Variables used in Empirical Analysis
The dependent variable, denoted by WinningPrice, is the second highest bid plus an
increment.
Since a seller can earn her previous feedback from either a selling behavior or a
buying behavior, we denote the seller reputation variables by AllPos, AllNeg, AllNeu,
AllPosRatio, SellPos, SellNeg, SellNeu, SellPosRatio, BuyPos, BuyNeg, BuyNeu, and
BuyPosRatio. Each buyer or seller may get multiple comments from a unique customer. In
order to eliminate the bias from the comments from a set of particular customers and to
reduce the effect of reputation manipulation, we counter only the first comment left by a
customer to evaluate the above reputation variables. This is common in the literature, and it is
also how eBay calculate and report users’ reputation. Variables AllPos, AllNeg, AllNeu and
AllPosRatio are, respectively, the number of positive, negative and neutral comments from
unique registered users and the ratio of positive comments among all comments from unique
registered users. SellPos, SellNeg, SellNeu and SellPosRatio are, respectively, the number of
positive, negative and neutral comments from her unique buyers and the ratio of positive
comments among all comments from unique buyers. BuyPos, BuyNeg, BuyNeu, and
BuyPosRatio are respectively, the number of positive, negative and neutral comments from
her unique sellers and the ratio of positive comments among all comments from unique
sellers.
We select the 3rd generation, 15G iPod MP3 players made by Apple Inc. The standard
item
comes
with
accompanying
accessories
like
Apple
earphones,
AC adapter, firewire cable, PC firewire adapter. The retail price for a brand new product is
$299.00. The auction items in our sample are homogeneous except accessories and degree of
usage. Extra accessories will increase the value of the item package and a brand new iPod
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will be valued higher than a used one. So we control the accessories and the new or used
property of the auction items with two variables Accessories and NIB. The variable
Accessories refers to the value of the extra accessories included with the item sold. The value
of the accessories was obtained from the Apple online store as the market price. NIB is a
dummy variable. NIB takes the value one if the item is listed as new-in-box and zero
otherwise.
The remaining variables defining the auction’s characteristics are: NumofBids, Length,
FirstBid, Paypal, Gallery, HighLight, Bold, and Reserve. NumofBids refers to the total
number of bids showed up in the bid history of an auction. Since we removed those
withdrawn or no-bid transactions, there are at least one bid for each transaction: NumofBids is
greater than or equal to one. Length is the number of days an action listing lasts. FirstBid is
the starting bid amount the seller chooses. Paypal, Gallery, HighLight, Bold, and Reserve are
dummy variables. Paypal takes one if the seller accepts payment though Paypal or credit
cards, which provides certain degree of payment protection to the buyers. Gallery, HighLight,
and Bold, respectively, referring to whether the seller put a thumbnail photo, highlighted the
listing with an eye-catching colored band, or boldfaced the listing in search and listing pages.
These variables control the sellers’ effort to grab the buyers’ eyeball and provide more
information about the product to reduce the risks from product quality. We use dummy
variable Reserve to indicate whether the seller put a reserve price or not.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive summary of the statistics for the variables used in
our analysis.
The winning price ranged from a high of $345.00 to a low of $223.50. The mean
trading price of $283.13 is lower than the market price of $299.00 posted on Apple online
store. The eBay traders receive about 50 times of the number of comments as a seller than as
a buyer.
The unknown type feedbacks are the feedbacks that are not classified as from buyer,
or seller. It counts for 6.7 percent of all the feedbacks of the sellers in our dataset. Since all
feedbacks from June 21st 2001, are classified as from seller, or from buyer. So all unknown
type feedback in our dataset are feedbacks left before June 21st 2001. For those sellers who
have unknown type comments, we read through the comments and classified the sources
manually.
The data is supportive of our main hypothesis, that is,
1. The sellers are not pure sellers; they are also buyer in some time. In our dataset, 14% of
the time these sellers are buying from eBay.
2. Comparing with their buying transactions, the sellers got distortional higher negative
feedback ratio in their selling transactions, 1.20 percent vs. 0.69 percent, i.e., the negative
ratio of the users as seller is 74 percent higher than the negative ratio as buyer.
3. If we look at the seller’s negative feedback ratio when they are indeed seller, instead of
from all transactions, it is higher. In this case, it increases from 1.13 percent to 1.20
percent.

5. Results
We derive our results from the multivariate regression model.
ln(Winning Pr icei ) = β 0 + β1 ln( SellPosi + 1) + β 2 ln( SellNegi + 1) + β 3 ln( BuyPosi + 1)
+ β 4 ln( BuyNegi + 1) + α ∑ X i + ε i
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(4)

where Xi represents all the product characteristics and auction characteristics:
ln(Accessories+1), NIB, NumofBids, Length, FirstBid, Paypal, Gallery, Highlight, Bold, and
Reserve.
Table 3 reports the results of our empirical analysis. We find that both the positive
and the negative comments the seller received during her previous sales have significant
effect on the bidding price. A 10 percent increase in the positive selling record will increase
the bidding price by 0.29 percent or around $0.82, while a 10 percent increase in the negative
selling record will decrease the winning price by 0.5 percent or around $1.41. Suppose an
iPod seller has one positive comment and one negative comment from previous buyers. No
matter how many positive comments she has received from previous sellers, one more
positive selling comment will increase her expected winning price by about $8.19 and one
more negative selling comment will reduce her expected winning price by about $14.11. The
results also show that negative ratings are paid more attention and therefore have higher
impact to the winning price than positive ones do.
The comments earned from the sellers’ previous purchases do not affect the winning
price significantly. And the signs of the impact are opposite to our expectation, that is, an
increase in the positive buying record will decrease the winning price and vice versa, which
does not make sense.
The above results further empirically support our hypothesis that buying reputation
does not affect the seller’s goodwill in a selling transaction. A rational buyer will only
consider the seller’s selling record when bidding for the item.
The winning price increases significantly with the value of accessories and whether
the product is new or not, and auction properties such as accepting paypal, number of bids,
and the value of first bid.
We also find that the alternative functional forms, for example, replace the
ln(WinningPrice) with WinningPrice, does not affect the estimation results and significance
of the variables.

6. Conclusion
Trust building in the online community is a crucial issue that relates to the
survivability of the Internet market. We build a simple model to illustrate our propositions
about the online feedback mechanism adopted by some major consumer-to-consumer online
auction websites. That is, given the flexibility in identity creation and switching in the
Internet environment, a bidder will separate a seller’s selling reputation from her buying
reputation.
We take the theory to the trading data on eBay.com---a major online auction web site
and get the following major results:
(1) The numbers of a seller’s positive and negative comments from her buyers solely
are significantly correlated with the bidding price of her sales transactions;
(2) The numbers of a seller’s positive or negative comments earned in her purchasing
transactions are not significant in explaining the bidding price of her sales transactions;
(3) Negative comments are weighted more heavily than positive ones.
EBay has added the indication of the types of transactions in the feedback history
pages since June 2001. Moreover, starting from January 2004, tabs that grouped the
feedbacks from sellers and from buyers were included in the feedback history pages. These
practices show that eBay has realized the importance of separating the selling feedbacks from
the buying feedbacks. Since negative feedbacks are paid more attention and have greater
impact on the bidding prices of the items, based on our and other research conclusion, eBay
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should give the exact feedback score, typically, number of negative feedbacks, from the
selling feedback history.
We are testing our hypothesis with transactions of other categories of items on
eBay.com. It would be interesting if we could study with the data from the online trading web
sites from other countries, for example, EachNet.com in China.
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Figure 1. Examples of Feedback Mechanism Used in eBay and Yahoo! Auctions.
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (N = 135)
Variable
Dependent
Variable
Reputation
Variables

Item
Characteristics
Auction
Characteristics

Winning
Price
SellPos
SellNeg
SellNeu
BuyPos
BuyNeg
BuyNeu
Accessories
NIB
NumofBids
Length
FirstBid
Paypal
Gallery
Highlight
Bold
Reserve

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

$283.13

20.37

$223.50

$345.00

1200
36
51.6
24.9
0.51
0
4.56
0.66
22
3.4
$30.53
0.88
0.66
0.01
0.24
0.10

1130
40
55.4
28.4
0.58
0
20.99
0.48
9.2
1.9
71.63
0.33
0.47
0.09
0.43
0.30

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
$0.01
0
0
0
0
0

7483
198
189
152
4
0
200
1
50
10
$289.99
1
1
1
1
1
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5.651
(361.50)
0.109
0.095

I
0.007*
(1.73)
-0.020***
(-3.52)

5.659
(336.79)
0.153
0.127

II
0.018***
(3.05)
-0.047***
(-3.94)
-0.013
(-1.96)
0.093**
(2.43)

5.615
(279.48)
0.305
0.273

III
0.028***
(4.59)
-0.052***
(-3.26)
-0.012*
(-1.66)
0.072*
(1.77)
0.024***
(3.90)

5.609
(241.26)
0.307
0.268

IV
0.030***
(4.33)
-0.054***
(-4.49)
-0.013*
(-1.73)
0.075*
(1.83)
0.023***
(3.83)
0.0001
(0.57)
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5.572
(187.22)
0.331
0.286

V
0.028***
(3.97)
-0.052***
(-4.33)
-0.052
(-0.88)
0.056
(1.33)
0.027***
(4.29)
0.0001
(1.34)
0.043*
(1.92)

Note: *** --- p value < 0.01, ** --- p value < 0.05, * --- p value < 0.10.

R2
Adj. R2

Constant

NumofBids

Reserve

Bold

Gallery

Length

Paypal

NIB

FirstBid

ln(Accessories+1)

ln(BuyNeg+1)

ln(BuyPos+1)

ln(SellNeg+1)

Independent Variable
ln(SellPos+1)

5.542
(158.41)
0.346
0.297

VI
0.027***
(3.92)
-0.049***
(-4.07)
-0.005
(-0.59)
0.044
(1.04)
0.026***
(4.15)
0.0002
(1.50)
0.044**
(2.01)
0.027
(1.60)

5.518
(138.64)
0.357
0.301

VII
0.028***
(4.05)
-0.049***
(-4.12)
-0.006
(-0.79)
0.049
(1.16)
0.027***
(4.30)
0.0002
(1.55)
0.050**
(2.22)
0.028*
(1.69)
0.005
(1.28)

Table 3 Estimation Results (t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable = ln(WinningPrice)

5.537
(131.21)
0.368
0.307

VIII
0.029**
(4.14)
-0.050***
(-4.20)
-0.006
(-0.68)
0.065
(1.49)
0.027***
(4.35)
0.0001
(1.18)
0.041*
(1.76)
0.032*
(1.90)
0.003
(0.82)
-0.025
(-1.35)

5.537
(130.53)
0.368
0.300

IX
0.028**
(3.80)
-0.049***
(-3.75)
-0.005
(-0.54)
0.064
(1.43)
0.027***
(3.95)
0.0001
(1.07)
0.041*
(1.75)
0.033*
(1.90)
0.003
(0.82)
-0.027
(-1.34)
0.006
(0.22)

5.538
(131.05)
0.379
0.306

X
0.025***
(3.25)
-0.047***
(-3.56)
-0.003
(-0.39)
0.059
(1.29)
0.028***
(4.12)
0.0001
(1.17)
0.045*
(1.90)
0.035**
(2.04)
0.004
(1.12)
-0.023
(-1.14)
0.003
(0.14)
-0.031
(-1.34)

XI
0.024***
(3.14)
-0.042***
(-3.25)
-0.003
(-0.31)
0.046
(1.05)
0.030***
(4.39)
0.0003**
(2.21)
0.046**
(2.01)
0.032*
(1.88)
0.004
(1.16)
-0.018
(-0.93)
-0.001
(-0.03)
-0.023
(-0.99)
0.002**
(2.38)
5.488
(118.53)
0.413
0.336

